Defeat reconsidered

Analysis 73 (1):49-51 (2013)
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Abstract

It appears to have gone unnoticed in the literature that Pollock's widely endorsed analysis of evidential defeat entails a remarkably strong symmetry principle, according to which, for any three propositions D, E and H, if both E and D provide a reason to believe H, then D is a defeater for E's support for H if and only if, in turn, E is a defeater for D's support for H. After illustrating the counterintuitiveness of this constraint, a simple, more suitable, alternative to the Pollockian account is offered.

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Jake Chandler
La Trobe University

Citations of this work

Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
Epistemic Defeaters.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reasons Against Belief: A Theory of Epistemic Defeat.Tim Loughrist - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska - Lincoln

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References found in this work

Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.

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