Availability: The cognitive basis of experience

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):148-149 (1997)
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Abstract

Although A-consciousness and P-consciousness are conceptually distinct, a refined notion of A-consciousness makes it plausible that the two are empirically inseparable. I suggest that the notion of direct availability for global control can play a central role here, and draw out some consequences.

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David Chalmers
New York University

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