Availability: The cognitive basis of experience

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):148-149 (1997)
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Abstract

Although A-consciousness and P-consciousness are conceptually distinct, a refined notion of A-consciousness makes it plausible that the two are empirically inseparable. I suggest that the notion of direct availability for global control can play a central role here, and draw out some consequences.

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10.1017/s0140525x97240057

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David Chalmers
New York University

Citations of this work

Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. pp. 2--219.
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.

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