Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):590-593 (2013)
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Abstract

In a recent paper entitled “Truth does not explain predictive success” , Carsten Held argues that the so-called “No-Miracles Argument” for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness , survives Held’s criticism unscathed

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Author Profiles

Gustavo Cevolani
IMT School For Advanced Studies Lucca
Luca Tambolo
Università degli Studi di Trieste (PhD)

References found in this work

A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
Scientific progress as increasing verisimilitude.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:73-77.
Verisimilitude: The third period.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):1-29.

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