Remarks on the Interest-relative Theory of Vagueness

Acta Analytica 28 (3):381-394 (2013)
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Abstract

I discuss the interest-relative account of vagueness and argue for a distinction between relational vague predicates and non-relational vague predicates depending on the kind of properties expressed by them. The strategy rests on three arguments arising from the existence of clear cases of a vague predicate, from contexts in which a different answer is required for questions about whether a vague predicate applies to an item, and whether such an item satisfies the interest of an agent, and from cases where an object changes up to the point of becoming P, where P is a vague predicate. In the second part of the paper, I distinguish between relational properties and non-relational properties, and I argue for the view that some vague predicates can express non-relational properties, comparative relational properties and interest-relative properties. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that vagueness cannot be reduced to interest-relativity

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María Cerezo
Complutense University of Madrid

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Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Vagueness in context.Stewart Shapiro - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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