Abstract

I shall discuss failure of naturalistic ethical theories to satisfy two requirements for an adequate ethical theory: on the one hand, the arguability requirement, which is that an ethical theory should do something to resolve moral disagreements by the use of argument; on the other hand, the practicality requirement, which is that an ethical theory should be able to account for the necessary relation between morality and action – by which I mean the capacity moral judgments have to provide everyone with justifying reasons for action. Such two limits of naturalism will be examined by considering Iris Murdoch’s and John McDowell’s views about ethics. The former are centred around the notion of moral vision, as opposed to choice and action; the latter are focused on the notion of moral sensibility. While putting forward two different forms of naturalism, Murdoch and McDowell agree that descriptive and evaluative meanings of ethical terms are not independent of one another, and that people who make conflicting moral judgments about something do see different facts. Moreover, both Murdoch and McDowell hold that moral reality is much more complex than reality which is investigated by natural sciences