Abstract

In this dissertation, I explore the tension between David Hume's optimistic introduction of a new philosophy of human nature and his despairing conclusions in Book One of A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume begins by outlining a new science of human nature, founded on cautious observation and a strong sense of the proper boundaries of philosophical inquiry; at the end of Book One, he concludes that his epistemology ends in a hopeless choice between false reason and no reason at all. In between those two points, however, Hume provides a compelling account of the role of the imagination, allowing us to see our capacity to form beliefs in those situations where reason has been found powerless. Hume is effective in showing the limits of reason; he is equally effective in showing the compensatory power of the imagination. Given the confident exposition of the role of sentiment in epistemology, it is surprising to see the stark dilemma that Hume poses in his conclusions. Instead of a new notion of reason that reflects our capacity for belief, we find a despairing view of human understanding, redeemed only by the natural resilience of human nature. This moment of despair is the key to understanding Hume, and I argue that it represents a missed opportunity. Identifying this weakness in Hume's argument helps us to understand a central ambiguity in Hume's philosophy. Hume is constrained from fully embracing his philosophical insights by his own intellectual conservatism; that is, because of his own wariness of dramatic reversals, he respects established philosophical boundaries. Thus, despite his novelty, he is unwilling to remake philosophy in his own image. After a close look at the arguments of Book One, I conclude that Hume's unwillingness to shift the boundaries of reason to incorporate the notion of sentiment has the paradoxical effect of precluding the reformation of philosophy that his innovative ideas demand