Abstract

This essay aims, first of all, at underlining the peculiar idea of perception that emerges from Husserl’s Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907. In analysing the constitution of the Thing and the external perception, Husserl describes an activity which is, at the same time, legal and dependent from the data of reality. In so doing, he manages to avoid both the scepticism, which is ingrained in the idea of perception as simple and spontaneous opening to facts, and the idealism that, on the contrary, cuts off its essential connection with the external reality. Husserl’s interpretation of Tactility confirms his ability to avoid the accusation of relapsing into a kind of realist or idealist metaphysical dialectics. In these lessons he analyses Touch not as a simple and immediate contact with things or self-perception without any residue, but as stratified, complex and not linear perception, which represents a moment of the constitution of one’s own body