Possibilist Explanation: Explaining How-Possibly Through Laws

Erkenntnis 86 (4):835-852 (2019)
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Abstract

Abstract‘Possibilist Explanation’ is a promising account of scientific explanation which avoids the familiar problems of “how-possibly explanations”. It explains an event by showing how-actually it was epistemically possible, instead of why it was epistemically necessary. Its explanandum is the epistemic possibility of an actual event previously considered epistemically impossible. To define PE, two new concepts are introduced: ‘permissive condition’ and ‘possibilist law’. A permissive condition for an event is something that does not entail the event itself, but a necessary condition for it. A ‘Possibilist Law’ is a kind of scientific law that predicts that in the absence of a necessary condition N, the event E is not possible. Both PE and PL are legitimate and neglected parts of scientific knowledge and are especially suitable for human sciences.

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Gustavo Castañon
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora

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How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.Nancy Cartwright - 1999 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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