Abstract

In the dissertation, we discuss and compare the views of John Locke and Thomas Reid on the nature of generality and how we have knowledge of it. Locke treats those issues with his doctrine of abstract ideas. To understand abstract ideas, we look at Locke's general views about the nature and origin of ideas. We then discuss abstract ideas, considering two possible interpretations, the first of which was Berkeley's. We show that the second interpretation is more in keeping with Locke's remarks, and avoids Berkeley's famous criticisms. We also show that with that interpretation, Locke's own views on universality are strikingly similar to Berkeley's own. But we suggest that a better interpretation would be something of a combination of the two. ;Next, we turn to Reid's critical views. We begin by examining Reid's reasons for rejecting the theory of ideas as an adequate account of cognitive activity. We then suggest how these general criticisms, together with his specific criticisms of Locke's theory of memory, may be used to sketch a critique of Locke's doctrine of abstraction as a theory of how we classify--i.e., how we recognize properties of objects. ;Finally, we turn to Reid's own views on the nature of generality and how we are able to classify. We begin with an overview of Reid's method. We then consider his solution to the problem of universals, showing that it rests on two insights. Next, we consider how Reid accounts for how we understand general terms--i.e., what it is to have concepts. We show that for Reid, to have a concept is to have a set of abilities to distinguish an attribute and to recognize its occurrence in many objects, operations that Reid calls "abstracting" and "generalizing." We also show that although this sounds remarkably Lockean, Reid's view is very different from Locke's. ;In the conclusion, we compare Reid's "general conceptions" with Locke's abstract ideas. We show how general conceptions are much more versatile than abstract ideas, and how this versatility contributes to Reid's improvements on Locke's views. We see how with general conceptions, Reid takes Locke's insights and embeds them in a more workable and plausible theory