Inference, Assent and First Principles in John Henry Cardinal Newman

Dissertation, University of Notre Dame (1983)
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Abstract

This dissertation is an exegetical study of Newman's notions of 'inference,' 'assent,' and 'first principles.' The basic thesis is that the notion of natural inference is equivocal. The object of the dissertation is to show that this equivocation exists, and to explore its ramifications. ;The first chapter clarifies the relationship between formal, informal and natural inference. 'Natural inference' is revealed as being equivocal since it connotes two distinct acts of the mind; the limiting case of informal inference, and intuition. ;The second chapter begins by distinguishing assent from certitude. Then the notion of 'intuition' is traced through Newman's works. It has two aspects; one actively generative , the other actively receptive . Simple assent is associated with natural inference in both its forms. But while natural inference, qua inference, is really distinct from its concomitant simple assent, natural inference, qua instinct, is not. ;The third chapter examines the relationship of inference to assent. Several critical accounts of the relationship are discussed and it is concluded that it is primarily a matter of "a change in the order of viewing." ;The fourth chapter applies the findings of the earlier chapters to the notion of 'first principles.' As there were two kinds of natural inference, so there are two corresponding kinds of first principles: absolute first principles and relative first principles. The conflation of inference and assent which occurred in 'natural inference' occurs also in the notion of the 'illative sense.' This faculty turns out to have two distinct functions: one concerned with intuition , the other with inference . ;The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the role of first principles in Newman's thought. In the matter of choosing rationally between competing sets of first principles, it is claimed that, although Newman does not provide us with the necessary or sufficient conditions to effect such a choice, he does provide us with some pragmatic tests which render our choice of first principles rational. Ultimately, however, Newman has to allow for the possibility of equi-rational irreconcilable first principles

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