Assertion and relative truth

Synthese 191 (6):1309-1325 (2014)
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Abstract

An account of assertion along truth-relativistic lines is offered. The main lines of relativism about truth are laid out and the problematic features that assertion acquires in the presence of relative truth are identified. These features are the possibility of coherently formulating norms of assertion and the possibility of grounding a rational practice of assertion upon relative truth. A solution to these problems is provided by formulating norms for making and assessing assertions that employ a suitably relativized truth predicate and a perspectival notion of correctness. Two potential objections to this proposal are addressed

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10.1007/s11229-013-0329-6

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Citations of this work

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Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Assertion and assessment sensitivity.Matías Gariazzo - 2019 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 60 (143):355-376.
Los compromisos normativos de la aserción relativista.Ramiro Caso - 2017 - Análisis Filosófico 37 (2):143-168.

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Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

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