Authors
Vanessa Carbonell
University of Cincinnati
Abstract
Knowledge is necessary for certain moral obligations. In learning something new, one sometimes triggers a moral obligation. This paper argues that the existence of these knowledge-based obligations poses a problem for the view that we are not only free to choose the course of our own lives, including our careers and personal projects, but also free to change our minds and quit at any time to pursue something else. For if our choice of life path has generated knowledge-based moral obligations that we must fulfill, then it is apparently not true that we can quit at any time. To resolve this tension, this paper proposes a relatively demanding set of conditions under which it is permissible to swap one career or life project for another. The resulting compromise reconciles the moral force of knowledge-based obligations with the basic freedom to choose less-than-optimal careers and projects. It also highlights the distinctive role played by knowledge and expertise in generating the intractable problem of morality’s demandingness.
Keywords moral obligation  moral demands  scope of morality  freedom  expertise
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

You Oughta Know: A Defence of Obligations to Learn.Teresa Bruno-Niño & Preston J. Werner - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):690-700.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Non-Ideal Accessibility.Holly Lawford-Smith - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):653-669.
The Ratcheting-Up Effect.Vanessa Carbonell - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):228-254.
Normativity and Reason.Thomas Pink - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):406-431.
Is Moral Phenomenology Unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97.
Morality and Freedom.By Alan Carter - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):161–180.
Locke on Consent: The Two Treatises as Practical Ethics.Michael Davis - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):464-485.
Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-108.
Pro-Tanto Obligations and Ceteris-Paribus Rules.Danny Frederick - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
A Unified Theory of Virtue and Obligation.Arthur J. Dyck - 1973 - Journal of Religious Ethics 1:37-52.
Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-09-07

Total views
87 ( #132,433 of 2,499,250 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #28,316 of 2,499,250 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes