Abstract
My intention is to cast light on the characteristics of epistemic or fundamental
research (in contrast to application-oriented research). I contrast a Baconian notion of
objectivity, expressing a correspondence of the views of scientists to the facts, with a
pluralist notion, involving a critical debate between conflicting approaches. These conflicts
include substantive hypotheses or theories but extend to values as well. I claim that a
plurality of epistemic values serves to accomplish a non-Baconian form of objectivity that
is apt to preserve most of the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science. For instance,
pluralism is the only way to cope with the challenge of preference bias. Furthermore, the
plurality of epistemic values cannot be substantially reduced by exploring the empirical
success of scientific theories distinguished in light of particular such values. However, in
addition to pluralism at the level of theories and value-commitments alike, scientific
research is also characterized by a joint striving for consensus which I trace back to a
shared epistemic attitude. This attitude manifests itself, e.g., in the willingness of scientists
to subject their claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. This shared
epistemic attitude is embodied in rules adopted by the scientific community concerning
general principles of dealing with knowledge claims. My contention is that pluralism and
consensus formation can be brought into harmony by placing them at different levels of
consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of social conventions
regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific community.