The Roots of Knowledge

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):81-95 (1993)

Abstract

I defend the view that propositional knowledge can be defined as follows: A knows that p if and only if A believes that p because p. Spelling out the meaning of 'because' in this formula results in a causal-explanatory view of knowledge.

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L. S. Carrier
University of Miami

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