Utilitas 11 (1):91-96 (1999)

Authors
Erik Carlson
Uppsala Universitet
Abstract
Frances Howard -Snyder has argued that objective consequentialism violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In most situations, she claims, we cannot produce the best consequences available, although objective consequentialism says that we ought to do so. Here I try to show that Howard -Snyder's argument is unsound. The claim that we typically cannot produce the best consequences available is doubtful. And even if there is a sense of ‘producing the best consequences’ in which we cannot do so, objective consequentialism does not entail that we ought, in this sense, to produce the best consequences
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820800002284
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References found in this work BETA

A Theory of Human Action.Myles Brand - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (9):249-257.

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Citations of this work BETA

Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Objective Consequentialism, Right Actions, and Good People.Eric Moore - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):83 - 94.
Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.

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