Abstract
Following a series of textual gestures which suggest that Schelling is the culmination of the German Idealist tradition, this essay is an attempt to articulate the ambiguity of the Hegel-Schelling relationship in Slavoj Žižek's work and its productive potential. Characterizing his own dialectical materialism again and again as Hegelian, but never a Schellingian project, Žižek often belies the central role played by late Schelling of the Freiheitsschrift and the Weltalter in the self-unfolding logic of the tradition. But why is there such an oscillation? Describing the Grundlogik of German Idealism as the radical ontological incompletion of reality announced by the abyss of freedom of the Kantian subject, Žižek's own philosophy suggests that neither Hegel nor Schelling were able of themselves to fully articulate the consequences of the deadlock of freedom. Yet, what I argue is that it is only by an implicit retroactive reconstruction of the inner logic of post-Kantian philosophy, an aprés-coup unearthing of philosophical possibilities hidden within these two thinkers made possible by psychoanalysis, that Žižek is able to present his reading of the radical nature of subjectivity in German Idealism. By unpacking this latent reconstruction I will not only demonstrate the consistency and comprehensiveness that a Žižekian reading of the history of German Idealism can display but also the complex intertwining of Schellingian ontology and Hegelian logic at the core of Žižek's own parallax ontology