Reflexive Intermediate First-Order Logics

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (1):75-95 (2008)
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Abstract

It is known that the set of intermediate propositional logics that can prove their own completeness theorems is exactly those which prove every instance of the principle of testability, ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ. Such logics are called reflexive. This paper classifies reflexive intermediate logics in the first-order case: a first-order logic is reflexive if and only if it proves every instance of the principle of double negation shift and the metatheory created from it proves every instance of the principle of testability

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References found in this work

Applications of trees to intermediate logics.Dov M. Gabbay - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (1):135-138.
Intuitionistic Completeness and Classical Logic.D. C. McCarty - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (4):243-248.
Reflexive Intermediate Propositional Logics.Nathan C. Carter - 2006 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (1):39-62.

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