POLITICAL JUSTIFICATIONISM: A CASUISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT

TRAMES 24 (3):339-361 (2020)
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Abstract

The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper, drawing on Jennifer Lackey’s justificationist approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement’s scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore.

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References found in this work

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Fake News and Partisan Epistemology.Regina Rini - 2017 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (S2):43-64.
IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts.W. B. Gallie - 1956 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1):167-198.

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