On Having Reasons

Analysis 26 (6):189 - 192 (1966)
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Abstract

Thesis: Even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Hume) Antithesis: A man who knows of at least one case of an X being a Y, and who does not know of any positive reason for thinking that an X might not be a Y, has some reason for thinking that all X's are Y's (p. 81). When I speak of ‘some reason’ I mean the contradictory of no reason at all (p. 85). (‘A Possible Extension of Logical Theory?’ Geoffrey Hunter, Philosophical Studies 1965, pp. 81–8.)

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James Cargile
University of Virginia

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