Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):239-248 (2016)

Authors
Ian M. Church
Hillsdale College
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Addressing the ‘virtue conflation’ problem requires the preservation of intuitive distinctions between virtue types, that is, between intellectual and moral virtues. According to one influential attempt to avoid this problem proposed by Julia Driver, moral virtues produce benefits to others—in particular, they promote the well-being of others—while the intellectual virtues, as such, produce epistemic good for the agent. We show that Driver's demarcation of intellectual virtue, by adverting to the self-/other distinction, leads to a reductio, and ultimately, that the prospects for resolving the virtue conflation problem look dim within an epistemic consequentialist approach to the epistemic right and the epistemic good.
Keywords virtue consequentialism  virtue epistemology  virtue responsibilism  moral and intellectual virtue  intellectual virtues
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.218
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References found in this work BETA

Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.
An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.David Hume & Tom L. Beauchamp - 1998 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 190 (2):230-231.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Dilemma for Driver on Virtues of Ignorance.Josh Dolin - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):889-898.

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