Abstract

Philosophical discussions of hatred have tended to examine whether and when hatred can be morally or rationally justified. If hatred is rational, for instance, it might be because it is a fitting response to the given circumstances (Ben-Ze’ev 2000; Bell 2011). At the same time, hatred typically motivates action, and action of quite characteristic types. As Fischer et al. (2018) note, the so-called ‘emotivational’ goal of hatred appears to be not merely to hurt the target of hatred, but to destroy them or let them suffer. Such types of action immediately raise questions about their moral status, but we should also ask questions about their rational status. In particular, when acting on the basis of a hatred that may itself be rational – at least in the sense of being fitting – are we also acting rationally? Working with a conception of rational agency according to which we act rationally when we guide our actions by reasons seen as reasons (see Jones 2003; Carman 2018), and granting that hatred can be fitting and thereby be a response to genuine reasons, I explore the ways in which acting on the basis of hatred could or could not be rational.