Gert on rationality, intrinsic value, and the overridingness of morality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):441–446 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Gert’s Morality is a remarkably original, lucid, ambitious, and wide-ranging book. No short essay can do justice to it. I offer four criticisms of Gert. First, he doesn’t adequately defend the priority he gives to avoiding evils over seeking goods. Second, he begs some important questions about moral realism in a way that is crucial for his definition of rationality and his larger purposes in the book. Third, his rejection of utilitarianism and religious morality rests on an assumption he doesn’t adequately defend. Fourth, he is mistaken in claiming that moral judgments are not overriding.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
33 (#419,244)

6 months
1 (#1,042,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas L. Carson
Loyola University, Chicago

Citations of this work

Teleological Suspensions In Fear and Trembling.Kris McDaniel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):425-451.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references