Abstract

The early work of Alasdair MacIntyre aims to provide resources to “fragmented” modern selves for adjudicating “incommensurable” claims of rival moral traditions and for committing to one with full allegiance. But MacIntyre seems to undermine rational choice through his thesis of Rational Particularism, namely, that there is no tradition-independent, universally acceptable rational standpoint from which to evaluate competing claims of rival traditions. In this paper I combat a prevalent argument that his Particularism thesis render the choice of tradition allegiance by fragmented selves wholly arbitrary, hence committing MacIntyre to relativism about practical rationality and moral theory. This argument founders on a false analogy between the self-avowed relativist and MacIntyre’s target reader. Thus, MacIntyre can retain strong particularism without yielding to relativism. I also show how MacIntyre can consistently offer rational, historical, imaginative, and personal narrative resources to fragmented selves who seek a coherent moral tradition.