Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1229-1254 (2020)

Authors
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Abstract
A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress. Key to this solution is the recognition of two distinct kinds of emotional skill and how these must be working in tandem when emotional experience plays such a justificatory role. The paper has two main parts, the first negative and the second positive. The negative part criticises the epistemic credentials of Epistemic Perceptualism Perceptual illusions. Philosophical and psychological essays, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012; Tappolet in Emotions, value, and agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Döring in The Philos Quart 53: 214–230, 2003; Döring in Dialectica 61: 363–394, 2007; Elgin, in: Georg, Kunzle Epistemology and emotions, Ashgate Alderchot, Farnham, 2008; Roberts in Emotions: an essay in aid of moral psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), the view that emotional experience alone suffices to prima facie justify evaluative beliefs in a way that is analogous to how perceptual experience justifies our beliefs about the external world. The second part of the paper develops an account of emotional skill and uses this account to frame a revisionary form of Epistemic Perceptualism that succeeds where the traditional views could not. I conclude by considering some objections and replies.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Sentimentalism.Anttin D. Kauppinen - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Trust, Distrust, and Testimonial Injustice.J. Adam Carter & Daniella Meehan - forthcoming - Educational Philosophy and Theory:1-11.
A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Wales

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