Abstract

Descartes has long been recognized as occupying a pivotal position in Western philosophy. At the very center of Descartes's innovation are his intimately related conceptions of mind and knowledge. These twin notions ground the main problems that have continued to exercise philosophers to this day. Indeed, his elaboration of these notions establishes for his successors the agenda of problems to be addressed and the vocabulary with which to address them--so much so that Spinoza, Locke, and Leibniz, despite their very significant disagreements, have much more in common with each other than with their medieval predecesors. This dissertation delineates the transition Descartes effects from a prevalent medieval conception of understanding to a modern conception of it. Through the examination of the discontinuities--and the continuities--between Descartes's account of the understanding and that of high scholasticism will emerge a characterization of two ways in which the understanding is autonomous in Descartes's view. These two sorts of autonomy shed light on the origin of a set of related concerns that give modern philosophy its coherence, setting it apart from medieval philosophy as a distinct tradition. A first sort of autonomy--the independence of the understanding from the senses--creates the modern problem of skepticism with regard to the external world, and is a necessary precondition for modern discussions of the scope and limit of human knowledge; a second sort of autonomy, concerning the ontological status of the mind, provides the background against which modern discussions of the mind/body problem take shape