An ecological approach to hinge propositions

Sképsis (25):1-16 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that hinge propositions are ways of acting that constitute abilities or skills. My starting point is Moyal-Sharrock's account of hinge propositions. However, Moyal-Sharrock's account leaves gaps to be filled, as it does not offer a unified explanation of the origin of our ungrounded grounds. Her account also lacks resources to respond to the issue of demarcation, since it does not provide a criterion for distinguishing ways of acting that can legitimately fulfill the role of ungrounded grounds from those that cannot. Without an answer to this issue, the relativistic threat is serious. I then propose that by narrowing the ways of acting to those that are constitutive of abilities, we can deal with the relativistic threat. I provide an ecological approach to abilities through which I explain why abilities are reality-soaked and therefore why the ways of acting that constitute them are legitimate ungrounded grounds. Based on that approach, I provide an answer to the issue of demarcation that defuses the relativistic threat.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Abordagem Ecológica das Habilidades e a Epistemologia dos eixos.Carvalho Eros - 2022 - In Plinio J. Smith & Nara Figueiredo (eds.), A epistemologia dos eixos: uma introdução e debate sobre as certezas de Wittgenstein. Porto Alegre: Editora Fênix. pp. 101-123.
Introduction: Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):73-78.
Abnormal Certainty: Examining the Epistemological Status of Delusional Beliefs.Svetlana Bardina - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4):546-560.
Dobradiças, Vertigem Epistémica e Moralidade.Nuno Venturinha - 2019 - Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (53):125-140.
Universal Hinges and the Bounds of Sense.Mark Fortney - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):967-979.
Hinge Contextualisma.Giovanni Mion - 2022 - Philosophical Investigations 45 (1):40-52.
Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism.Mark Walker - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):134-167.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-01-03

Downloads
306 (#63,646)

6 months
98 (#40,778)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Eros Carvalho
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Mary Jo Nye.

View all 27 references / Add more references