Relativism and Monadic Truth

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Hawthorne (2009)
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Abstract

Cappelen and Hawthorne present a powerful critique of fashionable relativist accounts of truth, and the foundational ideas in semantics on which the new relativism draws. They argue compellingly that the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth and falsity.

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Author Profiles

Herman Cappelen
University of Hong Kong
John Hawthorne
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy.David Plunkett - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):828-874.
Vagueness in Context.Stewart Shapiro - 2006 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
The Moving Spotlight Theory.Daniel Deasy - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2073-2089.

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