Quaestio 11:307-350 (2011)

Moving from the conviction that philosophy differs from mathematics because the signs of philosophy are words, i.e. audible Sprachlaute, and given that the vagueness of natural language cannot be eliminated by adopting a characteristic writing on the model of algebra, Kant poses the problem of how to write a philosophical book with a necessarily only phonetic writing, and yet aspiring to a certainty comparable to that of mathematics. His solution consists in showing, by means of acroamatic proofs, that there are synthetic a priori judgments in philosophy. According to Kant, this solution, which is made possible and is conditioned by the systematic framework provided by the Copernican revolution and by his study of reason, accounts for our capacity to read appearances as experience, but is still insufficient to give us an overall interpretation of the whole experience. Thus Kant adopts the reading and interpreting of a book as the metaphor of his investigation and uses it to highlight the distinct but cooperating fields of the understanding and reason
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DOI 10.1484/J.QUAESTIO.1.103019
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