Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):315-336 (2017)
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Abstract

In her very interesting ‘First-personal modes of presentation and the problem of empathy’, L. A. Paul argues that the phenomenon of empathy gives us reason to care about the first person point of view: that as theorists we can only understand, and as humans only evince, empathy by appealing to that point of view. We are skeptics about the importance of the first person point of view, although not about empathy. The goal of this paper is to see if we can account for empathy without the ideology of the first person. We conclude that we can.

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Author Profiles

Josh Dever
University of Texas at Austin
Herman Cappelen
University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Expanding Transformative Experience.Havi Carel & Ian James Kidd - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):199-213.
Transformative experiences and the equivocation objection.Yuri Cath - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
A typology of empathy and its many moral forms.Hannah Read - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (10):e12623.
First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
De se preferences and empathy for future selves.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Transformative Experience.Laurie Ann Paul - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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