Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 87 (3):259-291 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper is about the statics and dynamics of belief states that are represented by pairs consisting of an agent's credences (represented by a subjective probability measure) and her categorical beliefs (represented by a set of possible worlds). Regarding the static side, we argue that the latter proposition should be coherent with respect to the probability measure and that its probability should reach a certain threshold value. On the dynamic side, we advocate Jeffrey conditionalisation as the principal mode of changing one's belief state. This updating method fits the idea of the Lockean Thesis better than plain Bayesian conditionalisation, and it affords a flexible method for adding and withdrawing categorical beliefs. We show that it fails to satisfy the traditional principles of Inclusion and Preservation for belief revision and the principle of Recovery for belief withdrawals{, as well as the Levi and Harper identities. We take this to be a problem for the latter principles rather than for the idea of coherent belief change.

Similar books and articles

Implications of the Dutch Book: Following Ramsey’s axioms.Wei Xiong - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):334-344.
Belief revision.Hans Rott - 2008 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.
Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis.Lorenz Demey - 2013 - Foundations of Science 18 (4):599-610.
I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.
The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.
Is there a dutch book argument for probability kinematics?Brad Armendt - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.
Revocable Belief Revision.Hans van Ditmarsch - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (6):1185-1214.
Coherentist Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):315 - 330.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-18

Downloads
58 (#271,353)

6 months
11 (#225,837)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Hans Rott
Universität Regensburg
John Cantwell
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

Citations of this work

Towards a logic for ‘because’.Eric Raidl & Hans Rott - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-31.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references