Why We Shouldn't Reason Classically, and the Implications for Artificial Intelligence

In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Computing and philosophy: Selected papers from IACAP 2014. Cham: Springer. pp. 151--165 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that human beings should reason, not in accordance with classical logic, but in accordance with a weaker ‘reticent logic’. I characterize reticent logic, and then show that arguments for the existence of fundamental Gödelian limitations on artificial intelligence are undermined by the idea that we should reason reticently, not classically.

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Douglas Ian Campbell
University of Canterbury

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