Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble

Philosophical Studies 140 (1):1 - 18 (2008)
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Abstract

What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections.

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Ross Cameron
University of Virginia

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References found in this work

From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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