Synthese 197 (3):1225-1240 (2020)

Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Robert Kane’s libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane’s claim that there can be no contrastive explanation for self-forming actions is not an unwanted implication of his appeal to indeterminism, but is actually an implication of the fact that the agent’s will is not yet appropriately structured. I then explain how this can assist Kane with the luck objection.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1749-0
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Libertarian Approaches in Response to the Luck Argument.Jamal Kadkhodapour & Asgar Dirbaz - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 22 (4):5-26.

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