Dialogue 41 (1):163-168 (2002)

Authors
Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
Andrew Botterell has offered a fine response to my article, "Supervenience and Psycho-Physical Dependence". In my original article, I argued that Donald Davidson's brand of supervenience should be understood as a relation between predicates rather than properties, that this formulation captures a form of psycho-physical dependence that eludes other forms of supervenience, and that, as such, it might be useful to revisit Davidsonian supervenience as a means of expressing a plausible form of physicalism. Botterell's reply centres on offering support for the following two claims: that the distinction between properties and predicates "is irrelevant to issues concerning physicalism and supervenience" ; and that predicate supervenience is unhelpful to formulating a plausible form of physicalism. I think the first claim is false, but not for reasons that are readily apparent in the original article. My reaction to the second claim is more complicated.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0012-2173
DOI dialogue20024119
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References found in this work BETA

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.
Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept.Jaegwon Kim - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):1-27.
'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited.Jaegwon Kim - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):315-26.
Mental Quausation.Terence Horgan - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.
Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism?Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 19--26.

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