Putnam on the token-identity theory

Philosophia 27 (3-4):567-574 (1999)
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Abstract

Putnam raises two objections against the token-identity theory in his _Dewey Lectures. (1) Token-physicalism invokes a mysterious or _sui generis concept of identity between mental and physical event tokens; (2) The theory suffers from explanatory failure because it cannot individuate mental events using physical criteria. I argue that the first claim is false, since Davidson adopts the same criterion of identity Quine employs for ordinary objects which invokes a concept of identity we understand clearly enough. I then show that Putnam's second complaint is an extravagant demand that needs not be answered and is at odds with his own direct realism

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Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University

Citations of this work

Token physicalism and functional individuation.James DiFrisco - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):309-329.

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