Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):230-252 (2019)

Lucy Campbell
University of Warwick
ABSTRACTA widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2018.1512819
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Strong Cognitivist Weaknesses.Nathan Hauthaler - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.

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