On Staying in Character: Virtue and the Possibility of Deep Disagreement

Topoi 38 (4):719-723 (2019)
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Abstract

The concept of deep disagreement is useful for highlighting skills and resources required for reasons-giving to be effective in restoring cooperative or joint action. It marks a limit. When it is instead understood as a challenge to be overcome by using reasons, it leads to significant practical, theoretical, and moral distortions.

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Citations of this work

Was Aristotle a virtue argumentation theorist?Andrew Aberdein - 2021 - In Joseph Andrew Bjelde, David Merry & Christopher Roser (eds.), Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity. Cham: Springer. pp. 215-229.
Arrogance and deep disagreement.Andrew Aberdein - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London: Routledge. pp. 39-52.

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References found in this work

The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.
Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement.David Godden & William H. Brenner - 2010 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 2:41-80.
Revisiting deep disagreement.Dale Turner & Larry Wright - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):25-35.

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