Abstract

Ever since Wesley Salmon’s theory, the mechanical approach to causality has found an increasing number of supporters who have developed it in different directions. Mechanical views such as those advanced by Stuart Glennan, Jim Bogen and Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver have met with broad consensus in recent years. This paper analyses the main features of these mechanical positions and some of the major problems they still face, referring to the latest debate on mechanisms, causal explanation and the relationship between mechanisms and counterfactuals. I shall claim that the mechanical approach can be recognised as having a fundamental explanatory power, whereas the counterfactual approach, recently developed mainly by Jim Woodward and essentially linked to the notion of intervention, has an important heuristic role. Claiming that mechanisms are by no means to be seen as parasitic on counterfactuals or less fundamental than them – as it has been recently suggested –, and that yet counterfactuals can play a part in a conceptual analysis of causation, I shall look for hints in support of the peaceful coexistence of the two.