Synthese 156 (1):143-159 (2007)

Authors
Ross Cameron
University of Virginia
Abstract
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-005-2003-0
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References found in this work BETA

Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Being Known.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Possible Worlds.John Divers - 2002 - Routledge.
Existence and Contingency.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):117–139.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Ideological Parsimony.Sam Cowling - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.
Plenitude and Recombination.Alastair Wilson - forthcoming - In Helen Beebee & Anthony Fisher (eds.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Oxford University Press.
Real Impossible Worlds : The Bounds of Possibility.Ira Georgia Kiourti - 2010 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
The Grounds of Necessity.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (4):348-358.
Possible Worlds I: Modal Realism.Louis deRosset - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (6):998-1008.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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