Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451 (2005)

Authors
Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize this view and show that it is an attractive position, because it captures the insights of existing forms of epiphenomenalism without their onerous metaphysical commitments
Keywords Causality  Epiphenomenalism  Explanation  Metaphysics  Mind  Campbell, Keith
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00409.x
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.

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Citations of this work BETA

Events.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Anomalous Monism.Steven Yalowitz - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Las Raíces Cartesianas Del Naturalismo Epifenomenalista: El Caso de Thomas H. Huxley.Ricardo Mejía Fernández - 2014 - Metatheoria – Revista de Filosofía E Historia de la Ciencia 4:61--80.

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