Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):157-158 (2003)
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Abstract

Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.

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