Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):157-158 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,895

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why not go all the way.Richard Schuster - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):173-174.
Rationality and indeterminacy.Cristina Bicchieri - 2009 - In Don Ross & Harold Kincaid, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 159.
Beyond rationality: Rigor without mortis in game theory.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):180-192.
Rational belief and social interaction.Daniel M. Hausman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):163-164.
Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames.Reinhard Selten - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (1):1-36.
Game theoretic models and respect for ownership.John Archer - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):740-741.
Reciprocity and the social contract.Ken Binmore - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (1):5-35.
Equilibrium and Explanation.Huw Dixon - 1990 - In John Creedy, The Foundations of Economic Thought. Blackwells. pp. 356-394.
Game theory can build higher mental processes from lower ones.George Ainslie - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):16-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
169 (#149,978)

6 months
31 (#129,475)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The evolution of misbelief.Ryan McKay & Daniel Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493–510; discussion 510–61.
Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.H. Clark Barrett & Robert Kurzban - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (3):628-647.
The evolution of misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493-510.

View all 134 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references