Florida Philosophical Review 5 (1):35-44 (2005)

In this paper I examine Bernard Williams’ claim that an appealing conception of love can come into conflict with impartial morality. First, I explain how Williams’ claim can survive one strategy to head off the possibility of conflict. I then examine J.D.Velleman’s Kantian conception of love as another possible way to reject Williams’ claim. I argue, however, that Velleman’s attempt to transcend love’s partiality in his account of love produces an unappealing and unconvincing ideal. This is made particularly clear, I suggest, by the analysis that Velleman is forced to give of the kind of case that generated Williams’ observations in the first place. Thus Velleman’s account should be rejected
Keywords Love  Ethics of Love  Bernard Williams  David Velleman
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References found in this work BETA

Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting From Duty.Marcia Baron - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):197-220.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Amorality of Romantic Love.Arina Pismenny - 2021 - In Rachel Fedock, Michael Kühler & Raja Rosenhagen (eds.), Love, Justice, and Autonomy: Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: pp. 23-42.
Love and History.Christopher Grau - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):246-271.

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