The hypothesis of ether and Reid's interpretation of Newton's first rule of philosophizing

Synthese 120 (1):19-26 (1999)
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Abstract

My object is to question a recurrent claim made to the point that Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was hostile to ether theories and that this hostility had its source in his distinctive interpretation of the first of Newton's regulæ philosophandi. Against this view I will argue that Reid did not have any quarrel at all with unobservable or theoretical entities as such, and that his objections against actual theories concerning ether were scientific rather than philosophical, even when based on Newton's first rule. I argue further that Reid's insistence on Newton's rule concerns, not direct observation, but rather the notion of explanation itself.

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Robert Callergård
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Unwarranted assumptions: Claude Bernard and the growth of the vera causa standard.Raphael Scholl - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 82 (C):120-130.
Reid and the Newtonian Forces of Attraction.Robert Callergård - 2005 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2):139-155.
Scottish Common Sense, association of ideas and free will.Sebastiano Gino - 2020 - Intellectual History Review 30 (1):109-127.

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References found in this work

Henry Brougham and the Scottish Methodological Tradition.G. N. Cantor - 1971 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 2 (1):69.
Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science.Peter Urbach - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):357-360.
Hegel's Philosophy of Nature1. [REVIEW]Gerd Buchdahl - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):257-266.

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