Abstract

In this dissertation I challenge the functionalist theory of mental states, which asserts that mental types such as "pain" are "multiply realizable" causal relations. ;I begin by providing historical and theoretical background which is necessary for one to fully appreciate functionalism. I show why formerly fashionable theories of mind have fallen out of favor, review Davidson's arguments that reasons are causes, and give a brief account of "folk psychology." ;In discussing functionalism proper, I distinguish between two forms of the thesis: Folk functionalism holds that, e.g., the concept "pain" is the concept of something occupying a causal role. Psychofunctionalism claims that pain is a causal state, whether or not the word "pain" means this. ;Both versions are false. In criticizing folk functionalism I argue that many mind concepts are not concepts of states occupying a causal role. I also argue that the type-token distinction is deeply flawed. Finally, as a theory of mental types, functionalism is committed to the mistaken proposition that all mental particulars of a certain type such as pain have something in common. ;Psychofunctionalism is likewise false. What psychofunctionalists offer as examples of causal roles type identifying mental states are not in fact multiply realizable, and a functionalist theory of multiply realizable mental states would be hopelessly vague. Second, psychofunctionalism masquerades as a scientific hypothesis when in fact it is unable to advance a scientific claim, being neither verifiable nor falsifiable by scientific means. Finally, I show that, though the highly-acclaimed inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments fail to defeat functionalism, there exists a qualia objection which does defeat it.