Responsibility and reproach

Ethics 99 (2):389-406 (1989)
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Abstract

The wrongdoing that feminists critique often occurs at the level of social practice where social acceptance of oppressive practices and the absence of widespread moral critique impede the wrongdoer’s awareness of wrongdoing. This chapter argues that under these circumstances individuals are not blameworthy for participating in conventionalized wrongdoing. However, because social vulnerability to reproach is necessary to publicizing moral standards and conveying the obligatory force of moral requirements, it is sometimes reasonable to reproach moral failings even when individuals are excused.

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Cheshire Calhoun
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.
The epistemic condition for moral responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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