Philosophical Studies 1:1-27 (2021)

Authors
Claudio Calosi
Université de Genève
Abstract
In Calosi and Wilson (Phil Studies 2019/2018), we argue that on many interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM), there is quantum mechanical indeterminacy (QMI), and that a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI), as per Wilson 2013 and 2016, properly accommodates the full range of cases of QMI. Here we argue that this approach is superior to other treatments of QMI on offer, both realistic and deflationary, in providing the basis for an intelligible explanation of the interference patterns in the double-slit experiment. We start with a brief overview of the motivations for QMI and for a determinable-based account of MI (§1). We then apply a developed 'glutty' implementation of determinable-based QMI to the superposition-based QMI present in the double-slit experiment, and positively compare the associated explanation of double-slit interference with that available on a metaphysical supervaluationist account of QMI (§2). We then present and respond to objections, due to Glick (2017) and Torza (2017), either to QMI (§3) or to our specific account of QMI (§4); in these sections we also positively compare our treatment of double-slit interference to that available on Glick's deflationary treatment of QMI. We conclude with some dialectical observations (§5).
Keywords quantum indeterminacy  quantum mechanics  double-slit experiment  determinable-based indeterminacy  metaphysical supervaluationism
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Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1007/s11098-021-01602-7
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Quantum metametaphysics.Alessandro Torza - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):1-25.
Non-Accessible Mass and the Ontology of GRW.Cristian Mariani - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91:270-279.
Quantum Mechanics Without Indeterminacy.David Glick - forthcoming - In Valia Allori (ed.), Quantum Mechanics and Fundamentality: Naturalizing Quantum Theory between Scientific Realism and Ontological Indeterminacy.

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