Abstract
Hayek a souvent été critiqué pour avoir changé de méthodologie, passant de l’abstraction misesienne à l’empirisme popperien. L’article défend la thèse que Hayek n’a pas changé de position méthodologique et qu’il a, au contraire, toujours défendu l’adaptation des méthodes aux objets d’analyse à partir d’une conception présente dans The Sensory Order. Cette conception, qui le situe dès les années 20 entre celle de Mises et de Popper, peut être qualifiée d’“apriorisme faillibiliste” selon l’expression empruntée à Barry Smith.Hayek has often been taken to task for having allegedly changed his methodological allegiance by discarding Misesian abstraction in favor of Popper’s empiricism. This paper shows that Hayek has not altered his methodological stance but has rather continuously proposed to adapt the methods to the object being analyzed, and so, from an epistemological perspective worked out in The Sensory Order. This conception which locates him between Mises and Popper as early as the 1920s can be dubbed “faillibilistic apriorism”, to use Barry Smith’s felicitous design.
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DOI 10.1515/jeeh-1999-0408
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