Abstract
Quante’s intent is to open a dialogue between Hegel scholars and analytic philosophers that proves valuable for both areas of study. He succeeds on a number of levels. Hegel scholars working in practical philosophy will be intrigued by his argument that §§104–13 of Philosophy of Right have an internally consistent structure that has been missed previously because they have not been understood as addressing action theory. Since scholars have paid little attention to Hegel’s subjective will as an action theory, Quante’s burden is not to situate his position within current scholarship, but rather to defend his thesis that these sections can be read as an action theory that can stand on its own without presupposing Hegel’s system. He meets this burden but acknowledges that it is problematic to address any Hegelian concept apart from its placement and role in the system, and that his analysis serves only as a study of the questions inherent in action theory and not as a commentary on this part of the Philosophy of Right. However, while Quante treats these sections as an action theory that does not depend upon Hegel’s larger metaphysical commitments, he does not treat the concepts with which he works in abstraction, but sensitively employs Hegel’s logical works to elucidate their structure.