A Threat for Physicalism: a new Gedankenexperiment

Epistemologia 1:130-140 (2012)
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Abstract

We present a new thought experiment that raises a threat for Minimal Physicalism, i.e. the thesis according to which mental properties supervene on physical properties. Our proposal is an example of the so called hard problems in philosophy of mind, in particular the problem of maximal consciousness. We do not however presuppose anything about its very nature apart from the minimal, weak assumption that it is determined by first order mental properties. We argue that either Minimal Physicalism is unable to give an adequate account of the new thought experiment we present or has to explain the fact that two numerically distinct but physically indistinguishable individuals have different maximal consciousness due to their spatial location. We contend that this last conclusion is strongly at variance with our contemporary scientific image of the world.

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Vincenzo Fano
Università degli Studi di Urbino

Citations of this work

Is the mind a quantum computer?Claudio Calosi - 2014 - Epistemologia 2:194-206.
Is the mind a quantum computer?Claudio Calosi - 2013 - Epistemologia 36 (2):194-206.

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