Abstract

In his book Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects Justin Remhof defends, using resources from Nietzsche’s thought, the constructivist view that all objects themselves are constitutively dependent on human representational practices. I offer several criticisms of this defense. First, I criticize aspects of Remhof’s defense of the plausibility of such constitutive dependence - viz., his contention that constitutive dependence is distinct from and more plausible than causal dependence, and is compatible with the view that many objects would have existed even if human beings had never existed. Second, I criticize Remhof’s contention that constructivism can provide a powerful and plausible solution to the problem of compositional vagueness. Specifically, I argue that human representational practices can’t settle a broad enough range of boundary questions to alleviate the worries behind this problem.